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"Horton and the Who": Determining
Who is Affected by the Emerging
Statutory Battle Between the FAA and
Federal Labor Law
D.R. Horton Inc., v. NLRB 1
I. INTRODUCTION
In the early 2 0th century, social changes brought about a system designed to
protect employees. As part of the American system of labor laws, workers are
given certain rights to proceed collectively, to "band together," and to proceed as
a unit.2 Labor laws were first enacted in the United States during a period of Su-
preme Court jurisprudence that granted a broad array of powers to corporations, in
the form of "liberty of contract."3 Justice Holmes dissented in Lochner v. New
York, and planted a seed in his opinion that would later go on to support the idea
behind federal labor laws.4 Today, the Court's Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
jurisprudence on the interpretation of the FAA strays closer to the old Lochner era
of interpretation.5 In D.R. Horton federal labor law and the FAA squared off in
such a way that one must displace the other on the issue of enforceability of a
class arbitration waiver.
6
There are two statutes in play in D.R. Horton. On the one hand there is the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),7 which creates a method by which workers
may proceed collectively in a lawsuit.' On the other hand is the FAA,9 which
promotes the enforcement and validity of arbitration agreements.10 In D.R. Hor-
ton, these two laws clashed with one another.11 The Fifth Circuit held that the
FAA trumps the NLRA to the extent the two statutes conflict.12 Such rationale
adheres to a long line of Supreme Court precedent favoring the enforcement of
arbitration agreements generally.13 While adhering to stare decisis, this interpre-
tation ignores the historical context and purpose of the NLRA, and the core pro-
1. DR. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1935).
3. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 75 ("But a Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissezfaire. It is made for people
of fundamentally differing views ...."); see also infra notes 57-59 & accompanying text.
5. Frank Blechschmidt, All Alone in Arbitration: AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and the Substan-
tive Impact of Class Action Waivers, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 568 (2012).
6. D.R. Horton, Inc. 737 F.3d at 344.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
8. Id.
9. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
10. Id.
11. D.R. Horton, Inc. 737 F.3d at 349.
12. Id. at 364.
13. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 26 (1991); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974).
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tections created by the NLRA stand at risk of being washed away under the tide of
the Court's FAA interpretation.
1 4
II. FACTS & HOLDING
D.R. Horton, Inc. (Horton) brought suit against a former employee, Michael
Cuda, to enforce an arbitration agreement.15 Horton is a Delaware corporation
that buys and sells homes, and conducts its business principally in Deerfield
Beach, Florida.1 6 In January of 2006, Horton initiated a policy requiring all of its
current and new employees to sign a mutual arbitration agreement as a condition
of employment.17 The arbitration agreement contained an explicit class arbitration
waiver.18 This waiver effectively forced employees to seek individual remedies
and disallowed any sort of class proceeding or concerted legal effort.1 9 When the
policy was implemented, Horton also issued a Frequently Asked Questions docu-
ment (FAQ) and "proper responses" to company supervisors. One of these in-
structions directed supervisors to explain to concerned employees that the arbitra-
tion agreement extended to relief sought through the courts, but did not extend to
other avenues such as grievances filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) or the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).21 Horton
did not circulate the FAQ to all employees.22
Michael Cuda (Cuda) was a Horton employee when the policy change was
implemented in 2006.23 Cuda's attorney contacted Horton In 2008 to notify the
company Cuda had retained counsel to represent him and similarly situated cur-
rent and former employees in a class action suit against Horton.2 4 Counsel for
Cuda argued the NLRA25 had been violated for unduly restricting workers' rights
under Title VII.2 6 Horton filed an action to enforce the arbitration agreement and
alleged Cuda had waived any right to bring suit or class action.27 Cuda then peti-
tioned the NLRB for review of the enforceability of the arbitration agreement, and
the NLRB took his case.28
The administrative law judge (ALJ) 29 who presided over the case agreed with
Cuda and found Title VII had been violated.30 Specifically, the ALI found the
arbitration agreement was invalid because it would cause employees to "reasona-
14. Id.






21. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 12-CA-25764, 2011 WL 11194 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 3,2011).
22. Id.
23. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at *1 (Jan. 3, 2012).
24. Id.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
26. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at *2 (Jan. 3, 2012).
27. Id.
28. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2013).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1935) (the "trial stage" of the NLRB proceeding is headed by an administra-
tive law judge or "ALJ," and decisions made by the ALJ are appealable to a 3-member panel of judges
appointed by the NLRB; the 3-member panel decision is then appealable to the respective federal
circuit).
30. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 12-CA-25764, 2011 WL 11194 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 3, 2011) (ALJ decision).
[Vol. 2014
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bly believe" they could not file an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB. 1
Horton appealed to the NLRB." A three-judge panel for the NLRB affirmed the
ALJ's decision.33 Additionally, the 3-judge NLRB panel found the FAA and the
NLRA did not conflict, and even if they did, the FAA would have to give way to
the NLRA.34
Horton appealed the 3-judge NLRB decision to the Fifth Circuit.35 The Fifth
Circuit found the FAA and NLRA were to be interpreted together.36 First, the
Fifth Circuit addressed some procedural concerns Horton raised.37  The Fifth Cir-
cuit then addressed the merits of the case and found two different ways the arbitra-
tion agreement could be invalid.38  First, the arbitration agreement could have
been invalid under the savings clause of the FAA. 39 Alternatively, the NLRA
might have contained a congressional command to override the FAA.40 The Fifth
Circuit reversed the NLRB, finding a party can in fact waive the right to pursue
collective action arbitration; therefore, the NLRA's concerted activity protections
are not substantive rights and cannot be invoked under the savings clause of the
FAA.41
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In Horton's suit, he sought enforcement of an arbitration clause, and thus
opened the question of how courts are to interpret the FAA and the NLRA when
they appear to conflict.42  The FAA was originally enacted in 1925.43  At the
FAA's core is a presumption of validity for arbitration agreements. 44 Years of
jurisprudence require the FAA to be interpreted liberally in favor of arbitration.45
The NLRA provides workers' "concerted" activities are protected, providing em-
ployees the right to work together, bargain collectively, and to engage in "other
concerted activities. ' 46 When the NLRA was introduced in the Senate in 1934,
31. D.R. Horton, Inc., 737 F.3d at 349.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at *11.
35. D.R. Horton, Inc., 737 F.3d 344 at 349.
36. Id. at 357.
37. Id. at 352-54 (holding the NLRB did not lack a quorum and therefore had the authority to issue
the decision).
38. Id. at 358.
39. Id.; 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1925) (the savings clause allows traditional contract defenses to remain in full
force under the FAA: [a] written provision ... to settle by arbitration ... shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract.").
40. D.R. Horton, Inc., 737 F.3d at 358; see also Act of Feb. 12, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat.
883 (1925) (if the FAA were displaced to any extent under the NLRA, arbitration agreements that
violated the NLRA would not be enforceable).
41. D.R. Horton, Inc., 737 F.3d at 349 (additionally, the 5th Circuit held the NLRA does not contain
a congressional command to override the FAA).
42. Id.
43. Act of Feb. 12, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-401,43 Stat. 883 (1925).
44. Moses H. Crone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,24 (1983).
45. Id. ("Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements ... [t]he effect of the Section is to create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability,
applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.").
46. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1935) ("Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
No. 2]
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the sponsor Robert Wagner of New York stated the NLRA purported to "level the
playing field" between workers and employers. Legislative history often plays a
key part in the interpretation of how two statutes interact.48 The interaction of the
two statutes turns mostly on whether the rights created by the NLRA are substan-
tive rights, and then upon how those rights interact with the framework of the
FAA.49 The NLRA and the FAA each govern different specialized areas of the
law, but prior to D.R. Horton, the rights granted by federal labor law have never
clashed with the FAA as forcefully as they do now.'
°
A. FAA and Labor Law History
When the FAA was enacted in 1925,51 interpreting courts found that the pur-
pose of the bill was to "reverse the longstanding judicial hostility" towards arbitra-
tion, and even to put arbitration agreements on the "same footing" as other con-
tracts.5' Two other labor laws came shortly thereafter: the Norris-LaGuardia Act
passed in 1932,53 and the NLRA of 1935. 54 The FAA was passed during a period
somewhat distastefully remembered as the "Lochner Era. 55  The Lochner Era
lasted from roughly the end of the 1 9th century to the 1930s, and its zenith was
highlighted by the Court's decision in 1905 in Lochner v. New York.56 This era
came to an end when the Great Depression struck America in the late 1920s, al-
lowing newly elected Franklin Delano Roosevelt to pass his "New Deal" legisla-
tion.57 Some have argued the New Deal legislation contained rights for the work-
ing-class employee. 58 The Norris-LaGuardia Act, the NLRA, and the NLRB were
created in the midst of this stormy legislative reform, and the Lochner Era was
59
swept away : new rights were granted to employees, and new duties were as-
signed to employers. The Norris-LaGuardia Act has a specific section appointed
to describe the public policy of the act.60 In relevant part, it states:
[T]he individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise
actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby
to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore,
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection.") (emphasis added).
47. Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner/Cross-
Respondent, DR. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (2013) (No. 12-60031), 2012 WL 2245129, at
*14.
48. Id. at *7.
49. See infra Parts II.B, C.
50. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013).
51. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1925).
52. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1932).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1935).
55. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905); Jack M. Balkin, "'Wrong the Day it was Decid-
ed": Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 678 (2005) (asserting that the




58. Id. at 688.
59. Id.
60. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1932).
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though he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is
necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms
and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the in-
terference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in
the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu-
tual aid or protection.
61
B. Whether Section 7 of the NLRA Creates a Substantive Right
Keeping the historical context and purpose of the two statutes in mind, the
analysis turns on whether Section 7 of the NLRA creates a "substantive right" to
proceed collectively as a unit.62 If it does, such a right cannot be waived.63
The difference between a procedural right and a substantive right has been the
subject of much discourse. 64 In Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A., v. All-
state Ins. Co, 65 the test that the United States Supreme Court used to ascertain
whether a right was procedural or substantive depended on whether the modifica-
tion was one that "really regulates procedure." 66 The Court has held that altering
discovery rules is a procedural right. 67 Altering the rules of evidence is also pro-
cedural. 68 These can be altered because the substance behind the procedure is not
being adjudicated, i.e., if the contracted-for-result seeks to extinguish the right
altogether, or purports to remove an available remedy, this would alter the sub-
stance of the right. 69 The Court has held that a party does not forego any substan-
tive rights simply by entering into an arbitration agreement.7 0  Instead, any sub-
stantive rights are protected and cannot be waived.7 1
The NLRB is charged with administering the NLRA and interpreting any am-
biguous provisions contained therein. 2 Judicial deference is usually given to
these administrative decisions.73  All NLRB interpretations must acknowledge
other relevant laws and interpret the NLRA in compliance with other federal
61. Id.
62. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
63. Id.
64. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 407 ("if it governs only 'the manner and the means' by which the litigants' rights are
'enforced,' it is valid; if it alters 'the rules of decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [those]
rights,' it is not").
67. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) ("procedures might not be as
extensive as in the federal courts").
68. Id.; Contracts to Alter the Rules of Evidence, 46 HARv. L. REV. 138 (1932).
69. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407.
70. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
71. Id. ("a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute .... It trades the pro-
cedures ... for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration").
72. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536 (1992).
73. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) ("If,
however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the
court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence
of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.").
No. 2]
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law. 4 The NLRA must also be applied in harmony with other relevant laws. 5
Because the NLRB is the agency charged with interpreting labor disputes, In re
Horton sets precedent via the Chevron7 6 doctrine that Section 7 of the NLRA
would create a substantive right to proceed collectively as a unit. In In re 127
Restaurant Corp,7 7 the parties stipulated, and the NLRB affirmed, that formation
of a class constituted concerted activity under Section 7 of the NLRA.7" In Brady
v. National Football League,7 9 the Eighth Circuit affirmed the NLRB's finding
that the policy and purpose of the NLRA permitted the formation of a class action
under federal labor law.80 In NLRB v. Stone,81 a negotiation contract between an
employer and employee was held invalid because it unduly restricted the employ-
ees' rights to collectively bargain and be mutually protected. 82
The right to certify a class action has been held not to be a substantive right
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23.83 While class actions under
FRCP 23 are not exactly the same as the right to "concerted activity" under the
NLRA, 84 the Supreme Court's treatment of FRCP 23 may be helpful in shedding
light on the issue.85 In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,86 the Supreme Court
stated formation of a class action under FRCP 23 was a procedural right only, not
substantive.87 In Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper,88 the Court found use
of FRCP 23 involved procedure, and did not affect substantive rights.
89
The only Supreme Court decision to address substantive rights to certify a
class under a statute appears in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.90 Gilmer
involved an analysis surrounding the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA).91 The Court held class actions under the ADEA were subject to arbitra-
tion and the plain language allowing collective suits did not create a substantive
right to proceed collectively.92 The Plaintiffs in Gilmer argued arbitration could
not fulfill the purpose of the ADEA because arbitration does not allow for "broad
equitable relief' or for class actions. 93 The Supreme Court did not agree with this
74. S.S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942).
75. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
76. In re 127 Rest. Corp., 331 N.L.R.B. No. 269, at *15 (2000); Brady v. Nat'l Football League, 644
F.3d 661, 673 (8th Cir. 2011); NLRB v. Stone, 125 F.2d 752, 757 (7th Cir. 1942); In re Extendicare
Homes, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. No. 70, at *19 (2006).
77. In re 127 Rest. Corp, 331 N.L.R.B. No. 269, at *15 (2000).
78. Id.
79. Brady v. Nat'l Football League, 644 F.3d 661, 673 (8th Cir. 2011).
80. Id.
81. NLRB v. Stone, 125 F.2d 752, 757 (7th Cir. 1942).
82. Id.
83. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445
U.S. 326, 332 (1980).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 613.
87. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b), "[the ADEA] must be interpreted in keeping with Article III
constraints, and with the Rules Enabling Act, which instructs that rules of procedure 'shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right').
88. 445 U.S. 326 (1980).
89. Id. at 332 ("the right of a litigant to employ Rule 23 is a procedural right only, ancillary to the
litigation of substantive claims").
90. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991).
91. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1967).
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argument, finding arbitration agreements and the ADEA were not fundamentally
at odds with one another because arbitrators are able to fashion equitable relief.
94
The Court concluded arbitration does not preclude the EEOC or other labor law
agencies from bringing an administrative suit against a corporation.
95
The dissent in Gilmer looked to the chronological development of the FAA
and federal labor law (something the majority did not address) and forewarned of
the danger of enforcing arbitration in the labor law context. 96 The majority hold-
ing in Gilmer was narrow-Section 1 of the FAA 97 applies only to laborers who
work specifically in commerce that had to do with physical transportation across
state lines. 98 Justice Stevens criticized the majority's reading of the FAA and
stated if such an approach were used, it would snowball into a FAA jurisprudence
far greater than he believed the court intended; thereby erasing much of the pur-
pose and usefulness of federal labor law.99 Justice Stevens opined that courts have
the power to issue "broad injunctive relief," which is the "cornerstone to eliminat-
ing discrimination in society"-something arbitrators are not well suited to ad-
dress.100
The NLRB and several courts affirming NLRB decisions have found the right
to proceed as a class (in the labor law context) to be a fundamental one, not mere-
ly a procedural one, and as recognized in Gilmer, there is a danger to interpreting
certification of a class action in the labor context as a mere procedural right.10 1
C. FAA Jurisprudence and Recent Supreme Court Precedent
In the last several decades, the strength of the FAA has waxed, while other
statutes that appear to conflict with the FAA have waned. 02 This waxing of FAA
influence is highlighted by the Court's recent cases. 103
In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,10 4 the Supreme
Court decided that when parties enter into an arbitration agreement, the agreement
is between only the two parties.10 5 If the agreement does not explicitly mention
otherwise, individual arbitration is the default method under the FAA for settling
disputes, and collective action is precluded. 10 6  This highlights the Supreme
Court's preference for the enforceability of the FAA and arbitration, even when
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court has also put to one side any con-
cern about the inequality of bargaining power between an entire industry, on the one hand, and an
individual customer or employee, on the other. Until today, however, the Court has not read § 2 of the
FAA as broadly encompassing disputes arising out of the employment relationship. I believe this
additional extension of the FAA is erroneous.")
97. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1945) ("[N]othing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.")
98. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 41.
101. See infra notes 200-202.
102. William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DuKE L.J. 1215, 1260 (2001).
103. Id.
104. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684-85 (2010).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 684.
No. 2]
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the contractual arrangement does not explicitly mention individual arbitration. 0 7
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,08 the Court invalidated a California state
statute prohibiting class action waivers.10 9 The Court reasoned the California
statute disfavored and discouraged arbitration,110 inconsistent with the FAA's
purpose and meaning, and the liberal policy favoring arbitration.111
Stolt-Nielson and Concepcion both involved state laws that attempted to cir-
cumvent the FAA by carving out exclusions via the savings clause.112 The claims
in both cases were rejected, and the Court held that the state laws must fall to the
strength of the FAA. 113 The state laws interfered with the FAA's objectives and
the pro-arbitration scheme that the FAA created.1 14 To-date, the Court has devel-
oped an expansive reading of the FAA: the FAA trumps state statutory schemes
that treat arbitration agreements unfavorably in any way.115
D. Does the NLRA Contain a Congressional Command to
Override the FAA?
If the NLRA does not create substantive rights to proceed collectively, the on-
ly method of upholding the NLRA's protections would be to construe the NLRA
as containing an implicit command to override the FAA. 116 This can happen only
if the command is clear. 117 The burden of demonstrating a contrary congressional
command rests with the party alleging the existence of the command. 18 The con-
trary congressional command must be demonstrable through the text of the bill, or
the legislative history of the bill itself.119
In the case of Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,12 ° the Supreme
Court considered various rules that were applicable to understanding whether or
not the FAA should be overridden.121 In Shearson, plaintiff customers brought
suit against the defendant brokerage firm.122 Plaintiffs alleged the firm had violat-
107. Id.
108. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011).
109. Id. at 1753.
110. Id. at 1750 ("[T]here is little incentive for lawyers to arbitrate on behalf of individuals when they
may do so for a class and reap far higher fees in the process. And faced with inevitable class arbitra-
tion, companies would have less incentive to continue resolving potentially duplicative claims on an
individual basis.").
111. Id.




115. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The majority's contrary view ... rests
primarily upon its claims that the Discover Bank rule increases the complexity of arbitration proce-
dures, thereby discouraging parties from entering into arbitration agreements, and to that extent dis-
criminating in practice against arbitration. These claims are not well founded.").
116. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (citing
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) ("We must assume that if Congress intended the substantive
protection afforded by a given statute to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial
forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history.")).
120. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 222-23.
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ed the Securities Exchange Act (SEC) and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO).1" 3 Defendant moved to compel an arbitration agree-
ment between the parties.12 4 Plaintiffs claimed the SEC and RICO contained an
implicit Congressional command to override the FAA."' The Court noted that
there were only two ways to determine if a command to override existed: (1) the
legislative history or plain meaning of the statute would contain the command, or
(2) there would be an irreconcilable "implementation" between the two acts.
126
The Court noted that there was no legislative history on the issue, and the plain
meaning did not support an override l. 2  On the issue of "irreconcilable implemen-
tation," Plaintiffs argued that RICO claims were too complex to be decided by
arbitration. 12 8  The Court did not agree with this reasoning, holding nothing in
RICO pointed to override the FAA and that Plaintiffs had not carried their burden
of demonstrating the contrary.
1 9
Interpreting the FAA and the NLRA together may also require looking at the
date of the enactment of the statutes.130 Later-enacted statutes may modify earlier
statutes.131 Where the first statute is broad, and the second is narrow on the issue,
the later statute is held to have modified the first. 132 As a rule of statutory inter-
pretation, the act passed later in time should prevail. 133 The FAA was originally
enacted in 1925,134 whereas the NLRA came later in 1935.135 Congress then later
reenacted the FAA in 1947.136
Taken together, these significant parts illuminate the question of how courts
should analyze labor law under the FAA and the NLRA. 137 The first question is
whether "concerted activity" under the NLRA includes a substantive right to col-
lectively proceed in court.138 Secondly, if a substantive right has been created, the
FAA must be applied to determine if the statute fits within the savings clause of
the FAA-but as demonstrated from recent jurisprudence, the Court has been
hesitant to apply the savings clause, at least in accords with state law, in this man-
ner.139 Alternatively, even if the statutory right does not fit within the savings
clause, a statute may contain a congressional override command.
140
123. Id. at 223.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 224.
126. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987).
127. Id. at 239-40.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 242.
130. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 582 (1971) ("In the meantime we
have no choice but to trace out as best we may the uncertain line of appropriate accommodation of the
two statutes with purposes that lead in opposing directions.").
131. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143 (2000).
132. Id.
133. Chi. & N.W  Ry. Co., 402 U.S. at 583 (the Court noted that Section 2 of the Railway Labor Act
had been enacted later in time than an applicable portion of the Norris-Laguardia Act).
134. Act of Feb. 12, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-401,43 Stat. 883 (1925).
135. Act of July 5, 1935, Pub. L. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
136. Act of July 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 669 (1947).
137. See supra notes 41,45, 77, and 90.
138. See supra Part III.B.
139. See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
140. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
In D.R. Horton the Fifth Circuit took up the issue of whether a class arbitra-
tion waiver was valid in the federal labor law context.141 First, Defendant Horton
claimed some procedural hurdles had not been met by the NLRB. 142 The court
found for the NLRB on these issues and declared all of the procedural hurdles had
been satisfied. 143 At the core of its decision, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the exist-
ence of a conflict between the NLRA and the FAA. 144 The court found that alt-
hough the NLRA granted employees the right to proceed collectively, class ac-
tions were not a substantive right. 145 Because the right to pursue a class action is
not a substantive right, the court held the NLRA did not fit within the savings
clause of the FAA and the court then moved to apply the liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration to the NRLA. 146 The court noted the two statutes seemed
facially at odds, but the NLRA did not carry a clear enough congressional com-
mand to override the FAA, so the FAA superseded the NLRA to the extent they
clashed. 147
The NLRB argued that under Section 7 of the NLRA, employees have a right
to join together in concerted action and this encompasses the right to pursue arbi-
tration collectively. 148 The NLRB further contended that wide deference should
be given to the agency interpretation of such issues.149 The Fifth Circuit did not
agree with this argument, looking instead to the plain language of both of the stat-
utes. 15 The NLRA gives employees the right to proceed collectively against an
employer, but the court found this does not encompass class arbitration because
formation of a class of plaintiffs is not a substantive right.151 Instead, formation of
a class is a procedural right subject to waiver.152 Looking to other areas of sub-
stantive law such as the ADEA and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the
court held the right to form a class-even class arbitration-has always been
characterized as procedural and subject to waiver."'
Because the concerted activity provision of the NLRA did not bar the waiver
of class arbitration, the court then considered whether the NLRA fit within the
savings clause of the FAA. 114 A "detailed reading" of Concepcion answered this
question for the court.155 The facts and analysis of Concepcion led the Fifth Cir-
cuit to believe the NLRA was not a ground which "exist[ed] in law or equity" to
141. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2013).
142. Id. at 352-54 (the 5 h Circuit held the NLRB did not lack quorum and therefore had the authority
to issue a decision).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 356.
145. Id. at 359.
146. Id.
147. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013).
148. Id. at 355.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 355-56.
151. Id. at 355.
152. Id.
153. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 355 (5th Cir. 2013); see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 42 (1991) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
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revoke the contract between Horton and its employees.15 6 This was because the
gist of Concepcion rested on the idea that statutes or laws that purport to make
arbitration agreements generally unenforceable cannot withstand the strength of
the FAA.157 The court held this analysis was congruent with Supreme Court ju-
risprudence and the liberal federal policy supporting arbitration.158 The Court did
not make a distinction between state and federal laws for purposes of their analy-
sis.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit determined the NLRA did not contain a congres-
sional command to override the FAA.15 9 In order for such a command to exist, it
must be found in the plain language of the statute, the legislative history of the
bill, or by an irreconcilable difference between the two statutes.' To the court,
no such plain language existed in the NLRA to override the FAA, the legislative
history of the bill did not reveal an override command, and the FAA was reenact-
ed at a later point than the NLRA, thereby superseding the NRLA.16 1 As such, the
court concluded that nothing in the NLRA commanded the FAA be overridden.
1 62
In holding for Horton, the Fifth Circuit applied the liberal policy favoring arbitra-
tion agreements to federal labor laws.
163
V. COMMENT
In his book, "Horton Hears a Who,'164 Dr. Seuss relays a tale of an elephant
named Horton, who hears a cry of help coming from a small clover leaf.165 Hor-
ton has a belief, later proven true, that there is a tiny world of very small people
called "the Whos" living in a microscopic ecosystem on the leaf.166 Horton real-
izes the tiny ecosystem is vulnerable and needs the protection of a bigger, external
source. 16  Horton takes on the responsibility of protecting the Whos from those
who might cause them harm.1 68 Labor laws work much the same way as Horton
worked to protect the cloverleaf world-these laws protect employees and work-
ers by giving them "something larger" (class procedures) to use in their fight
against overreaching corporations and employers. One key feature of federal
labor laws is they allow plaintiff employees to band their voices together in con-
certed activity-giving them bargaining power and leverage. Without the ability
to band together in arbitration, individual employees lose their ability to bargain
on the same playing field as their employers. Without access to concerted activi-
ty, workers recede to a vulnerable state.
156. Id. at 358.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 362.
160. DR. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013).
161. Id. (emphasis added).
162. Id.
163. Id. (the Fifth Circuit analyzed the claim in much the same way as other circuits did, and were
"loathe" to create a split on the issue).
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First, this Note explains that an all-powerful FAA preemption has broad-
reaching practical implications for the landscape of labor law. Next, this Note
argues preemption of federal labor law by the FAA ignores the purpose and pro-
tections federal labor laws were designed to create.
A. Practical Implications of an FAA Override Against Labor Law
If the FAA is allowed to override the NLRA and other labor laws, several
harsh implications emerge for employees. General contract notions of fairness
will be ignored, colorable claims by employees may never reach the ears of an
attorney, and the NLRB may lose much of its purpose.
A first concern revolves around the difference between employment and con-
sumer contracts. 169 Consumer contracts happen quickly, and the consumer re-
ceives some finite good with which she walks away. The consumer often has
other options to choose from and other places to do business. The face-to-face
time between the parties is limited, and the whole process is fairly short. Con-
sumers consent to the contract during a purchase.
7 0
Arbitration clauses within the employment context are vastly different than
consumer contracts. The formation of the employment contract is usually brief,
but the negotiations concern a realm of substantive implications, and employers
effectively control much of the day-to-day of their employees' lives.71 Review-
ing courts in the employment context often ask: "is the process too 'one-
sided?' 17 2 When the employer modifies the employment contract, the employee
will usually lack the power to say no-she may either say "yes," or forfeit her
employment.7 3 No new consideration is introduced in these situations except for
continued employment. 7 4 Due to issues like imbalance of power, employees
often consent to these clauses without any negotiation between the parties. For
too many employees, resolving any employment dispute through arbitration be-
comes an automatic term of employment. 7 5
These notions of fairness are aggravated by the fact that attorneys have great
incentive to take a class action, but very little incentive to represent a single em-
169. See Richard A. Bales, Contract Formation Issues in Employment Arbitration, 44 BRANDEIs L.J.
415, 435-458 (2006) (in-depth discussion on issues of contract formation).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term, Standard Form
Employment Agreements, 49 AZ. L. REV. 637, 648 (2007) (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Corp.,
500 U.S. 20, 26, (1991) ("[T]he enforceability ... turns principally on the quality and fairness of the
arbitral process selected. If the process is too one-sided, it might be viewed as a violation of the em-
ployee's underlying substantive rights.").
173. This occurred in Cuda's case. In re DR. Horton, Inc., No. 12-CA-25764, 2011 WL 11194
(N.L.R.B. Jan. 3,2011).
174. Arnow-Richman, supra note 172, at 664 ("The common law of contract formation, as it has
traditionally applied to employment relationships, may well recognize delayed terms as valid modifica-
tions in that they are accepted by the employee in exchange for continued employment. But surely the
reality is different.").
175. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The
Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENv. U. L. REV. 1017, 1020 (1996) ("[M]andatory arbitration
is often imposed as a condition of employment, without any consent or bargaining. Thus, mandatory
arbitration agreements operate as the new yellow dog contracts of the 1990s.").
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ployee in arbitration.17 6 This is further perpetuated in that attorneys are reluctant
to take employment disputes in the first place. 77 Empirical studies show when
attorneys have the incentive of a courtroom and formal litigation, they are hesitant
to take employment cases, to the point that 95% of employment disputes are
turned away.178 These claims are often small wage and hour claims that attorneys
obviously have less of an interest in litigating.7 9 However, when all of these
small claims add up and can be pursued as a class arbitration claim, attorneys are
incentivized by the potentially large payoffs.180 The fact attorneys have little in-
centive to take a single-arbitration dispute means many wronged employees may
never have their claims vindicated and they will never reach the hands of a com-
petent attorney who might have otherwise agreed to arbitrate for a whole class of
plaintiffs. The ability to band together in class arbitration unifies the cries of
trammeled employees to the point where an attorney may have incentive to litigate
the claims.
Without access to an attorney, and without representing pro se, a plaintiff has
few other options. One final avenue of relief is a labor agency like the NLRB.
Courts have routinely stated nothing in an arbitration agreement will preclude a
plaintiff from filing charges with such an agency.181 Despite this, the NLRB is
often over-busy, extremely under-funded, and only takes on a very small fraction
of the petitions it receives.182 The NLRB both investigates unfair practices by
employers and takes individual claims.183 If the FAA is allowed to override the
NLRA, this may result in a new wave of individual petitions to the NLRB and a
diminished NLRB capacity to investigate unfair practices. 184 Preclusion of right
to proceed collectively under the NLRA may also cause a clutter of cases to be
filed with the NLRB, slowing down the administration further.
Several giant implications exist for the employees who are forced to individu-
ally arbitrate their claims. General contract notions of fairness may be ignored,
and employees may not be able to acquire legal counsel. The purpose of the
NLRB may ultimately be frustrated, because it will be further swamped with
claims, leaving the NLRB without the ability to employ the full use of its investi-
gatory function.
176. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) ("[T]here is little incentive
for lawyers to arbitrate on behalf of individuals when they may do so for a class and reap far higher
fees in the process"); see also Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 445 F.3d 25, 59, n.21 (1st Cir. 2006) ("In any
individual case, the disproportion between the damages awarded to an individual ... and the attorney's
fees incurred to prevail on the claim would be so enormous that it is highly unlikely that an attorney
could ever begin to justify being made whole by the court.").
177. Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM.




181. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 286 (2002).
182. Maurice E. R. Munroe, The EEOC: Pattern and Practice Imperfect, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
219, 270 (1995).
183. Id.
184. Theodore J. St. Antoine, ADR In Labor and Employment Law During the Past Quarter Century,
25 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 411, 414-15 (2010).
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B. The Creation of a Colossal FAA
William N. Eskridge, a renowned author in the field of statutory interpreta-
tion, coined the term "super-statute" to describe a statute that is sweeping in
breadth.185 Eskridge argues the FAA is an example of a super-statute that has
made challenging arbitration nearly impossible. In part, this stems from the fact
when two statutes appear to clash, the burden rests with the plaintiff to demon-
strate why they clash and how they should be interpreted in light of one another.
1 86
Despite the FAA's initial goal of placing arbitration agreements on equal footing
with other contracts, the heavy presumption in favor of arbitration has consistently
been used to invalidate other statutory regimes and thus has created a "super-
statute."' ' In applying this rationale, the Fifth Circuit has adhered to the liberal
federal policy surrounding the FAA at the expense of invalidating other statutory
schemes.'
1 8 8
Horton argued because the FAA was passed later in time than the NLRA, it
should control.1 89 But the FAA was simply reenacted in 1947 as part of a series
of congressional updates to the FAA and numerous other bills.1 90 The "heart" of
the bills-their true purpose-should be examined in their historical context.1 91 A
true reading of the FAA and NLRA should be found to grant workers substantive,
not procedural, concerted rights. 192 Such an interpretation adheres to the context
and chronological passage of the two statutory schemes. 193 Though the plain lan-
guage of the statutes appear to conflict, they can be read in unity by interpreting
Section 7 of the NLRA to create a substantive right to proceed collectively in
arbitration, which cannot be waived. 194 This possibility exists by creating an ex-
ception to the FAA for the NLRA under the FAA's savings clause, harmonizing
the two statutes.
When two statutes govern one area of law and seem to conflict, courts will
routinely look at the dates and the context of the two statutes to see if the later
statute modified the first.195 Because the NLRA was passed later in time, it should
be interpreted as controlling when it comes to class arbitration. There is an inter-
185. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 102, at 1216 (describing super statutes in the following ele-
ments: "(1) seeks to establish a new normative or institutional framework for state policy and (2) over
time "sticks" in public culture such that (3) the super-statute and its institutional or normative princi-
ples have a broad effect on the law-- including an effect beyond the four corners of the statute.").
186. Id. at 1262.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1260-61 (arguing the FAA has preempted state anti-arbitration laws, and has displaced
federal securities, antitrust, and consumer protection laws).
189. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2013).
190. Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669 (1947); Charles A. Sullivan & Timothy P. Glynn,
Horton Hatches the Egg, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1013, 1047 (2013).
191. Sullivan & Glynn, supra note 190, at 1043.
192. Id. at 1020.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1021; see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 42 (1991) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (quoting C.J. Burger's dissenting opinion in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys-
tem, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 750 (1981) ("Plainly, it would not comport with the congressional objectives
behind a statute.., to allow the very forces that had practiced discrimination to contract away the right
to enforce ... in the courts. For federal courts to defer to arbitral decisions reached by the same com-
bination of forces that had long perpetuated invidious discrimination would have made the foxes
guardians of the chickens.")).
195. Sullivan and Glynn, supra note 190, at 1049.
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pretive canon against implied repeal, so the courts should and do try to reconcile
statutes in light of one another in a sensible way.1 96 The canon against implied
repeal states that later-enacted statutes will not "trump" an earlier statute unless
expressly stated-this canon is applicable because the FAA was passed prior to
the labor laws.1 97 Even if the NLRA does not contain an "express repealer" as
found in many federal labor laws,1 98 the purpose and historical context of the
NLRA is arguably sufficient to permit the NLRA to override the FAA and give
way to concerted activity rights for employees under federal labor laws.
1 99
A way to make sense out of these statutes is to observe them together in their
historical context. The congressional purpose underlying the NLRA was ex-
plained in the public policy section of the statute: "the individual unorganized
worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect
his freedom of labor., 20 0 Employment unfairness was pervasive in the 1930s, and
this policy pinpoints the system the 7 4 th Congress was attempting to remedy with
the passing of the NLRA.20 1 Much like the "Whos" in Horton Hears a "ho, the
workers who sign away rights to proceed collectively in arbitration are individuals
who are vulnerable and need protection. Historically, when the rights of employ-
ees had been trammeled, labor laws became the "something bigger" the "small
people" turned to as an avenue of relief.
20 2
In D.R. Horton, the Fifth Circuit held the NLRA did not create a substantive
right, and must give way to the FAA.20 3 In light of recent precedent and FAA
jurisprudence, if certiorari had been sought in D.R. Horton, the Court would have
likely affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit and its sister circuits. 204 If the
Supreme Court follows the rationale of D.R. Horton, the ability of employees to
proceed collectively under the NLRA will effectively be extinguished. While this
reading of arbitration and labor laws pays deference to precedent and FAA juris-
prudence, it largely ignores the historical context and overall purpose of labor
laws-such a decision could in fact "effectively end the labor laws. 20 5
VI. CONCLUSION
In D.R. Horton the Fifth Circuit decided the issue of whether the FAA pre-
cludes federal labor laws. The FAA has been interpreted in recent years with a
liberal policy favoring arbitration. This policy has been ever widening since the
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1040.
198. 29 U.S.C. § 115 (2006) ("All acts and parts of acts in conflict with the provisions of this chapter
are repealed.").
199. Sullivan and Glynn, supra note 190, at 1039.
200. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1932).
201. Sam Simon, How Statutes Create Rights: The Case of the National Labor Relations Act, 15 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1503, 1518 (2013).
202. NLRB v. Stone, 125 F.2d 752, 757 (7th Cir. 1942) ("Section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act ... is a blanket provision which may include numerous unfair labor practices.").
203. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 357 (5th Cir. 2013).
204. See supra note 163 & accompanying text.
205. Sullivan and Glynn, supra note 190, at 1054 ("If such a provision were actually 'enforceable,' it
would directly interfere with the employees' undisputed right to walk out together or engage in other
forms of collective protest. This is true whether, as a result, employees could be compelled to arbitrate
individually such controversies or be subject to discipline, or employers could, in reliance on the FAA,
enjoin the collective action in favor of arbitration.").
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Supreme Court started hearing claims against arbitration waivers. 2°6 Recent Su-
preme Court precedent in Concepcion and Stolt-Nielson highlight the zenith. The
NLRA has historically always granted workers the right to proceed collectively in
concerted action. If certiorari had been sought in D.R. Horton, the Court would
likely have interpreted the FAA and NLRA as conflicting laws, affirming the
position of the Fifth Circuit and holding the FAA trumps federal labor law on the
issue of class arbitration waivers. Such a holding and interpretation might have
ignored many of the facets of federal labor law-such as the history and purpose
of federal labor law. Even without a Supreme Court ruling, the Fifth Circuit in
D.R. Horton created far-reaching arbitration implications that will work to the
detriment of employees who are forced to singly arbitrate their claims against
powerful employers.
JAMES R. MONTGOMERY
206. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 26 (1991); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974).
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